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THE UN AS A REGULATOR OF PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE
MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM*
INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on one specific aspect of the prolifer-
ation of law in our economic life - the rising extent to
which the United Nations and its specialized agencies are in-
volving themselves in the regulation of private enterprise.
Unlike the existing body of domestic regulation, this new
burst of regulation does not appear to-be primarily motivated
by a desire to improve business performance. Rather, the
new style of rule-making is aimed at more fundamental, polit-
ical objectives, notably the redistribution of economic power,
and especially of income and wealth.
To compound the problem, the advocates of this new ar-
ray of regulation have overlooked - and certainly have not
learned any lessons from - the shortcomings of existing reg-
ulation of business in the developed countries. Study after
study has demonstrated that government regulators have so
often been oblivious to the burdens that they impose on the
private sector and, far more fundamentally, that such rules,
regulations, and directives often do little to advance their
stated social objectives. In fact, in practice they are often
counterproductive. One key finding permeates virtually all
serious analyses of government regulation of business: It is
the consumer who ultimately bears the burden that govern-
ment, wittingly or unwittingly, attempts to impose on
business.'
Compared to other international organizations such as
* Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and Director of
the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University
in St. Louis. Former Chairman, The President's Council of Economic Ad-
visors. This paper draws upon three Center studies Is the U.N. Becoming a
Global Nanny?, Regulation of Business by International Agencies, and Policing
the Global Economy. The author is indebted to Mary A. Fejfar for key re-
search work on each of these studies and to Michael J. Athey for helpful
research on this paper.
1. See Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Future of Business Regulation
(New York: Amacom, 1980) and Business, Government, and the Public, sec-
ond edition (Englewood Cliffs: N.J., PrenticeHall, 1981).
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the European Economic Community and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, the UN is in its
infancy as a regulatory body. Many of its measures are still in
an evolving state. Thus, a critical review is especially
appropriate.
Some of the international agency actions are broad;
others are directed at specific business activities. Some of
these regulatory efforts are in development or in negotiation
stages, in the form of "advisory resolutions" or "voluntary
guidelines." But in a growing number of instances, the regu-
lations are legally binding treaties. The form in which they
currently exist is often an indication of the next step that will
be taken in the international regulatory process. Yesterday's
studies lead to today's "voluntary guidelines" which, in turn,
become the basis for the treaties and directives of tomorrow.
These regulatory activities cover virtually every function
of the business firm - operations, marketing, finance, tech-
nology, services, and information. This paper reviews the
regulatory efforts by UN agencies in each of these six areas
of business decision making. Few areas of private business
decisionmaking escape the attention of one or another UN
agency.
REGULATION OF BUSINESS OPERATIONS - REGULATION OF
MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS
Of the proposals or actions of agencies designed to con-
trol the day-to-day operations of private companies, the most
ambitious is the United Nations draft code of conduct for
multinational corporations (or so-called transnational enter-
prises).' The MNC Code is being developed by a commission
of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC). Although approximately two-thirds of the Code's
seventy-one provisions have been agreed upon, the discussion
remains stalled with one major area of contention being the
definition of a multinational corporation.'
This stumbling block exists because the scope of the
Code goes beyond the definition of multinational corpora-
tions which is used in the existing scholarly literature. Most
serious analyses limit the definition of MNC to companies
2. See United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations,
Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, New
York, United Nations Document E/C.10/1983/S/5, June 2, 1983.
3. International Business-Government Counsellors, Inc., Washington
International Business Report, Vol. XIII, No. 21, October 29, 1984, p. 2.
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which produce goods and services in more than one country
and where there is more than one center of corporate deci-
sion making. Unilever and Royal Dutch Shell are the classic
examples. But the Code would apparently cover almost any
company that tries to sell its products to people in another
country. In the modern world, that includes virtually every
large company and many middle-size and smaller firms.
The language contained in some sections of the Code is
vague enough to make any sensible company think twice
before investing in overseas locations, where it might run
afoul of the Code once it is promulgated. One example is the
provision that multinational corporations should "avoid prac-
tices, products or services which cause detrimental effects on
cultural patterns and socio-cultural objectives as determined
by government." Where is the historical perspective of the
authors of the Code? Over the centuries, civilization has been
advanced by the transnational flow of science, art, music,
literature, culture, and commerce. Moreover, should the UN
encourage the governments of its member nations to set
"socio-cultural objectives" and require private enterprise to
follow the "cultural patterns" set by government? This is not
a traditional function of government regulation in a free
society.
Many of the organizations representing the business
community on these matters have offered a weak response -
asking only that the MNC Code be made voluntary and that,
if passed, it apply also to state-owned firms.4 That kind of re-
sponse is inadequate. The Code is a misguided instrument
and its basic rationale must be reconsidered in a fundamental
way. After all, the private corporation has been the key to
the successful development of Taiwan, South Korea, Singa-
pore, Japan, and other developing societies that have pros-
pered in our own time. In fact, Japan has succeeded in mov-
ing from the developing to the developed category in this
century, and it did so without an MNC Code.
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST RULES
The size and structure of firms operating in developing
countries can be affected by a UN code to control interna-
tional business practices. Rules amounting to global antitrust
4. Max Weisgias, "International Business and the United Nations
Code," The CTC Reporter, United Nations Center on Transnational Corpo-
rations, No. 12, Summer 1982, p. 16.
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regulations are embodied in "The Set of Multilaterally
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for Control of Restric-
tive Business Practices" (RBP Code).' The RBP Code was
adopted as a UN General Assembly resolution in 1980. Its
objective is to promote "the establishment or development of
domestic industries" in developing countries by eliminating
"disadvantages to trade and development which may result
from the restrictive business practices of transnational corpo-
rations or other enterprises."
Business practices to be regulated when they "limit ac-
cess to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition"
are: price-fixing agreements for imports and exports, collu-
sive tendering, market or customer allocation arrangements,
sales and production allocations by quota, collective actions
to enforce arrangements, such as concerted refusals to deal,
concerted denial of access to an arrangement, or association,
which is crucial to competition.
Other restricted practices include those resulting from
what is termed abuse of a dominant market position. Exam-
ples include: predatory pricing behavior, discriminatory pric-
ing on contract terms, horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate
mergers, takeovers, or joint ventures, resale price fixing of
imported goods, restrictions on the importation of products
marketed with legitimate trademarks by the exporter. The
RBP Code is now voluntary. Governments are expected to
implement it at national levels. In 1985, a follow-up confer-
ence is expected to propose that the RBP Code be made le-
gally binding.'
CONTROLLING "THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND"
The most sweeping UN regulation of private enterprise
is in the area of natural resources and mining. The most im-
portant example is the Law of the Sea Treaty, adopted in
April 1982.1 The United States is not a signatory. To receive
approval for sea mining, a private firm must agree to transfer
5. United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices,
"The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the
Control of Restrictive Business Practices," International Legal Materials,
Volume XIX, No. 3, May 1980, p. 813.
6. Wolfgang Fikentscher, "United Nations Codes of Conduct: New
Paths in International Law," American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume
XXX, No. 4, Fall 1982, p. 588.
7. See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, "United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," International Legal Materials,
Volume XXI, No. 6, November 1982, p. 1261.
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any technology it uses to the "Enterprise" (a governmental
unit operating under UN auspices) or to developing countries
for "fair and reasonable commercial terms." Also, the com-
pany must provide, for each site mined, information on a sec-
ond seabed site to be reserved for the Enterprise or develop-
ing countries. Private firms are, therefore, forced to subsidize
and build the Enterprise, the same unit which competes with
private enterprise.
A redistributive scheme similar to this one is contained
in the UN 1980 Moon Treaty.' That is another attempt by
other nations to "free ride" on Western technological inno-
vation. Since the treaty declares that "the moon and its natu-
ral resources are the common heritage of mankind," any
benefits accruing from those resources must be shared, and
an international regime will be established to oversee extrac-
tion of those resources. As a result, financial incentives to pri-
vate industry for space exploration are greatly reduced, since
developing countries share in the benefits but not the costs of
commercial activity in space. It is interesting to note that the
concept of "the common heritage of mankind" does not
cover oil, strategic minerals, and other valuable items located
in the developing nations.
REGULATION OF MARKETING ACTIVITIES
Companies involved in international marketing of prod-
ucts face a variety of regulatory measures. In recent years,
the most well known of these actions has been the Infant
Formula Code, adopted in 1981 by the United Nations
World Health Organization (WHO). This Code calls for a
wide variety of restrictions on the marketing and distribution
of breast milk substitutes. It applies to advertising of the
product, distribution of samples, labeling requirements, and
even the activities and compensation of marketing personnel.
Specifically, the Infant Formula Code calls for: No public ad-
vertising or promotion of infant formula products. No free
samples of infant formula products to be distributed. No
point-of sale advertising, such as special displays, discount
coupons, sales or tie-in sales to occur. Marketing personnel of
infant formula companies, in their professional capacity, may
not contact pregnant women or mothers of infants and young
8. See United Nations, "Agreement Governing the Activities of the
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," International Legal Materi-
als, Volume XVIII, No. 6, November 1979, p. 1434.
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children. No health care system should be used to promote
infant formula. Manufacturers and distributors may provide
health care workers only with scientific and factual materials
on infant formula. Samples of infant formula may not be pro-
vided to health care workers. Companies cannot use sales in-
centives or bonuses based on sales volume to reward sales and
marketing personnel. Marketing personnel should not par-
ticipate in education programs for women or mothers of in-
fants and young children. Labeling requirements for infant
formula should include: a statement on the superiority of
breastfeeding, a statement that the product only be used with
the advice of a health care worker, and a warning against
health hazards from improper preparation. The label may
not depict infants or other graphics that appear to "idealize"
the use of infant formula.9 The Infant Formula Code is not
legally binding, but governments are encouraged to enact
legislation for its implementation, and private companies
such as Nestle have been pressured by church groups into ac-
cepting it.
It turns out that the Infant Formula Code is not the ex-
ception but the "entering wedge" for broader UN regulation
of private enterprise. The World Health Organization is now
considering formulating a code on the marketing of
pharmaceuticals. It would create an international drug ap-
proval program and possibly include international rules on
drug labeling and advertising. Such action would be an ex-
tension to all countries of something similar to WHO's ex-
isting Essential Drug Program, which lists 250 "essential" ge-
neric drugs necessary for adequate health care that must be
made available to developing countries. Other suggestions
for UN supervision include chemicals and related products.
The Economic and Social Council has agreed to present
a sweeping consumer protection code before the UN General
Assembly that would create new obstacles to international
trade via controls on product advertising, safety, quality, and
pricing.10 The advocates of the UN Guidelines on Consumer
Protection claim that they are only intended to help the gov-
ernments of less developed countries adopt the kind of con-
9. World Health Organization, "International Code of Marketing
Breastmilk Substitutes," International Legal Materials, Volume XX, No. 4,
July 1981, p. 1004.
10. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Consumer Protection
Report of the Secretary General, United Nations Document E/1983/71, May
27, (St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington
University, June 3 1983).
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sumer laws which are in force in the United States." How-
ever, a reading of the fine print of the proposed Guidelines
reveals that they would go far beyond current practice.
The proposed Guidelines advocate replacing the present
reliance on market competition - reflective of consumer
choices - with a system of government direction. When we
look beyond their label, it is apparent that the Guidelines are
a model of vagueness and over-blown phraseology. Grand
goals 'are set forth in sweeping language that is, at best,
highly generalized and unclear. The Guidelines would inter-
fere with the goal of open international trade by establishing
a new set of non-tariff barriers. The following examples of
the many shortcomings of the Guidelines make it clear that
"protecting the consumer" is the furthest thing from the
minds of the drafters of this code.
The Draft Guidelines contain seven objectives which are
supposedly written "with special emphasis on the needs of de-
veloping nations." But one objective is "to facilitate produc-
tion patterns geared to meeting the most important needs of
consumers." In economies organized along private enterprise
lines, the needs of consumers are always the strongest influ-
ence on "production patterns;" the pressures of the market-
place dictate that. But the Guidelines suggest the need for a
controlled, highly centralized economy in which consumer
choices are, in practice, limited by the decisions of an all-wise
government. This objective strongly implies that a central
government must identify, and then control, the means of
achieving the "most important needs" of consumers. We
need only consult the dismal record of any of the world's cen-
trally planned economies in feeding their citizens to know
that promulgating this objective would severely hurt the de-
veloping nations.
Moreover, this objective overlooks the importance of
world trade in meeting the needs of consumers. Most grow-
ing economies gear production for international markets
rather than only for the so-called "more important needs" of
their own consumers. The case of Japan is instructive. If its
post-war economy had been limited to meeting the needs of
its own population, it surely would not enjoy the strong posi-
tion in world markets and the high standard of living that it
has today.
One general principle in the Guidelines raises grave
11. Esther Peterson, "U.S. vs. Third World Consumer Protection,"
The New York Times, October 12, 1984, p. 28.
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concerns:
the right to economic safety from offenses or malpractices
which deny consumers optimum benefit within their eco-
nomic resources.
On the surface, this phraseology sounds like mere gibberish.
But given the propensity of totalitarian regimes, particularly
communist governments, to throw people in jail for "eco-
nomic offenses" against the state, one must wonder as to the
ultimate application of such a provision.
Here is another provision:
Business practices affecting the processing and distribution
of food products and especially the marketing of highly re-
fined and expensive food products should be regulated in
order to ensure that such practices do not conflict with con-
sumers' interest or government aims in the area of food
policy.
Why are "highly refined and expensive food products"
singled out here? What all-wise power in a nation is going to
determine that a specific category of food products presents a
"conflict" with the interests of consumers, while another cat-
egory does not? In free societies with market economies, it is
the consumers themselves who make these decisions, protect-
ing their interests by not buying the product. The true pur-
pose of this provision appears to be to project "government
aims" in food policy.
REGULATION OF THE FINANCE FUNCTION
The finance functions of international firms are also be-
coming increasingly subject to the watchful eye of the UN.
For example, information disclosure and accounting practices
have come under the scrutiny of a variety of organizations.
The proposed MNC Code mentioned earlier calls for public
disclosure of a wide range of company financial data and
would give national governments the justification for ex-
tending those data requirements to cover many other aspects
of a company's international operations. Again, there seems
to be little awareness of the benefits and costs - and advan-
tages and limitations - of the existing national regulations
requiring such paperwork.
For example, the MNC Code calls for annual public dis-
closure of company financial information, including balance
sheets, income statements, and data on sales, profits, inves-
[Vol. I
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tors, investments, capital outlays, and research and develop-
ment expenditures.12 Additionally, information on the ac-
counting policies used to compile these data would have to be
made public. The information would be categorized by geo-
graphic area and line of business. Companies would also be
required to supply to a government any information required
for "legislative and administrative purposes" relevant to the
policies of the country. Since the MNC Code gives govern-
ments the power to determine which information is "rele-
vant," virtually any corporate information could be required
to be disclosed.
In the fall of 1982 the Economic and Social Council gave
permanent status to the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working
Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting
and Reporting. The Group has the mandate to improve the
"availability and comparability" of information disclosed by
multinational corporations, taking into "special considera-
tion" the needs of developing countries." This language
could mean that multinational corporations would be forced
to disclose financial information according to UN-dictated ac-
counting methods. Developing countries could then be sup-
plied with information to use in their efforts to control busi-
ness activities of multination corporations operating in their
countries.
The Accounting Group thus far has focused on issues of
information disclosure; it has also discussed issues such as val-
uation and measurement. It has identified items of substance
it wants to appear on corporate balance sheets, income state-
ments, and statements of sources and uses of funds. In addi-
tion, the Group has agreed on specific accounting disclosure
policies. It recommended that the following be disclosed by
multinationals: the balance sheet, the income statement, the
statement of changes in financial position, accounting poli-
cies, information on corporate structure, segmentation of fi-
nancial information both by geographic area and by line of
business.
The international business community has stressed that
the costs of collecting such information should be weighed
12. United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations,
Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, United
Nations Document E/C. 10/1983/S/5, June 2, 1983.
13. United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, "Interna-
tional Standards of Accounting and Reporting: Recommendations of the
Expert Group," The CTC Reporter, No. 12, Summer 1982, p. 35.
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against the perceived benefits. It has also warned against dis-
crimination in reporting requirements between multinational
and national enterprises. 14
Also, the UN Center on Transnational Corporations is
collecting data on direct foreign investment by multinational
corporations. Supposedly, such information will be furnished
to developing countries to help them gain greater influence
over private business. The very selective interest of this new
form of business regulation is intriguing. In contrast to the
focus on foreign investment by private corporations, outlays
by international and foreign government agencies are usually
welcomed with enthusiasm.
REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY
Companies that sell or license high-technology products
or services to developing countries would be affected by the
Transfer of Technology Code (or TOT Code) being negoti-
ated by the UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD).1 ' Many types of technology transfer contracts
are covered by the TOT Code, including the following: The
sale and licensing of industrial property. Know-how and tech-
nical expertise in either goods or the services of persons to
advise, manage, or train. Technological knowledge required
for installing and operating plant and equipment, including
turnkey projects. Technological knowledge required for ac-
quiring, installing, and operating machinery, equipment, in-
termediate goods, and/or raw materials which have been ac-
quired by purchase, lease, or other means. Technology
contents of industrial and technical cooperation
agreements.16
The TOT Code attempts to define the contractual re-
sponsibilities of parties involved in the transfer of technology.
It sets forth rules for negotiating, contracting, and post-con-
tract activities. For example, the technology-supplying coun-
try, upon request of the receiving party, is to provide specific
information on various elements of the technology as re-
quired for "technical and financial" evaluation of the tech-
14. William J. Stibravy, "Caution Advocated," The CTC Reporter, No.
14, Winter 1983, p. 30.
15. United Nations Conference on an International Code of Conduct
on the Transfer of Technology, Draft International Code of Conduct on the
Transfer of Technology, United Nations Document TD/CODE TOT/33,
May 12, 1981.
" 16. Id. paragraph 1.3.
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nology. The extent to which this is required is not clear. But
if a company selling a microcomputer could be required to
deliver specific information on the components of the
microprocessor, it Would be giving away competitively sensi-
tive and valuable information.
What the guidelines overlook is the extent to which such
regulations would impede the flow of technology. That cer-
tainly has been the experience in more developed nations:
regulation dampens the incentive to develop and utilize new
technology.
Other regulations which would restrict the development
and flow of technology are measures to redesign the current
international system of patent rights. UN agencies have been
actively trying to renegotiate the Paris Convention, which is
the international treaty that defines the current patent sys-
tem.1 7 Their goal is to implement a new patent system al-
lowing Third World nations to reap the benefits of Western
technological advances without paying any of the costs. For
example, developing countries would be able to impose com-
pulsory licensing if a patent is not used within two and a half
years after the patent is issued. Companies could be forced to
forfeit the patent - that is, turn the technology rights over
to the government - if the patent is not used within five
years after it is granted.
Those provisions sound innocuous until the regulatory
process is examined. For example, industries needing product
approval for manufacturing or marketing after patenting
would be severely affected. Obtaining approval for a new
pharmaceutical product often takes more than the five years.
Thus, a patent could be appropriated before the company is
ever allowed to manufacture or market the product.
REGULATION OF SERVICES
As worldwide trade in services has expanded, so have at-
tempts by international bodies to regulate it, including bank-
ing, insurance, and even tourism. The UN has become par-
ticularly involved in measures to closely regulate the shipping
industry. These activities are aimed at promoting companies
in developing nations at the expense of existing enterprises in
the developed nations. The centerpiece of these efforts is the
Code of Conduct for Liner Shipping, developed by
17. See International Business Government Counsellors, Inc., Wash-
ington International Business Report, Vol. XIII, No. 1, January 9, 1984, p. 4.
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UNCTAD, which is now in effect. 18 In essence, this Code sets
up a government allotment of participation in an industry by
strict allocation of shipping tonnage.
The Liner Code recommends a "40-40-20" formula for
allocating shipping rights. 19 This means that each of two
countries involved in a transaction are entitled to 40 percent
of the shipping tonnage, and independent shippers are allo-
cated the remaining 20 percent. All the countries ratifying
the agreement, with the exception of West Germany and the
Netherlands, are developing countries.
The Liner Code contains some ambiguous provisions. It
states that existing shipping services should not discriminate
against shippers, ship owners or traders, and that shipping
services (or "conferences") should consult shippers and make
available to interested parties information on activities rele-
vant to those parties and publish information on their activi-
ties. The Liner Code also limits rate increases to once every
fifteen months"0 and includes a mandatory conciliation pro-
cess. Thus, the Liner Code could serve to decrease demand
for Western shipping services.
Free enterprise in the shipping industry is further under
attack with a UN effort to eliminate open-registry shipping.
Current shipping companies could literally be forced out of
business if treaty negotiations proceed according to the
agenda set by developing countries. Their proposal includes
regulation of labor, management, financing, and ownership
of the shipping industry. For example, one objective is to re-
quire that a certain share of equity in a shipping company be
held by nationals of the flag (registry) state of a ship. If in-
vestment capital is scarce and, therefore, high-priced in these
countries, the shipping firm will be faced with the choice of
paying the higher cost of capital or changing the registration.
Another provision of the proposed treaty would require
that a fixed percentage of the shipping firm's managers be
nationals of the flag state. Experienced managers would have
to be fired and new management trained. More important,
18. U.S. Council for International Business, UN Report, Volume 4,
No. 4, May 16, 1983, p. 3.
19. United Nations Department of International Economic and So-
cial Affairs, Office of Programming Planning and Coordination, Main Issues
in Transport for Developing Countries During the Third United Nations Develop-
ment Decade 1981-1990, United Nations Document ST/ESA/l7, 1982, p.
10-11.
20. Richard Berryman and Richard Schifter, "A Global Straight-
jacket," Regulation, September/October 1981, pp. 19-28.
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however, is the usurpation of private decision making by an
international agency.
Companies that register their ships under flags of conve-
nience or in open-registry countries do so because costs of
fleet maintenance are lower in these countries. The irony is
that if the UN regulations are adopted, these countries could
lose their competitive advantage as low-cost suppliers of ship
registrations - and thus lose the benefits hoped for and even
the pre-regulation benefits as well. Consumers world-wide
would bear the burden of the cost increases to the shipping
firms.
REGULATION OF INFORMATION
The value of information in the world today is apparent
from the increasing efforts to control it. One effort to do so
has been spearheaded by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in its notion
of a New World Information Order. The stated aim of the
Information Order is to correct the "imbalance of informa-
tion flow" between developed and developing nations.
In 1980, a General Conference of UNESCO embraced a
set of recommendations which would downgrade the role of
the free press and enhance the position of government-con-
trolled news agencies. The recommendations are quite ambi-
tious. They include the following: Restriction on news-gath-
ering by "multinational" communications agencies. The
development of a code of ethics for journalists. Exploration
by the UN and the media of a means for international "right
of reply" to news accounts. Proposals include a UN news ser-
vice, the censorship of the release to the Western press of
information about the developing countries, and a require-
ment that multinational corporations supply governments of
the nations in which they operate with information for "legis-
lative and administrative purposes" relevant to their activi-
ties. This information is meant to facilitate the monitoring of
those corporations - at the same time that news on the de-
veloping countries themselves would be controlled by govern-
ments. This would reduce "the influence of market and com-
mercial considerations" on communications flows - thus
emphasizing government-run, rather than privately financed,
news media. There is also a proposal that guidelines be devel-
oped "with respect to advertising content and the values and
19851
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attitudes it fosters."21
On December 15, 1983, the UN General Assembly took
a step toward instituting a system of world journalistic cen-
sorship. A resolution was adopted promoting the develop-
ment of a New World Information Order. The U.S. strongly
opposes the Order and generally has protested UN actions to
limit freedom of the press.
In response to these and other concerns, the United
States and the United Kingdom announced that they would
formally withdraw from UNESCO in 1985, unless the organi-
zation made a variety of changes. These changes ranged
from improving the agency's management to refraining from
promoting policies that impinge on the free flow of informa-
tion. In an apparent attempt to abide by the guidelines pro-
posed by the U.S., UNESCO issued a policy statement that
represented a shift away from one aspect of the New World
Information Order, the licensing of journalists. It is interest-
ing to note that this statement was issued shortly before the
U.S. was scheduled to review its decision to withdraw from
UNESCO. 22
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The examples presented in this paper are a small sample
of a large and rapidly growing phenomenon. Yet, the public
at large knows little about this new development.
Americans still think of the UN as an organization de-
voted to peacekeeping - the function with which it is most
explicitly charged in its charter. There is little awareness of
the extent to which the UN is becoming an economic body
involved in radically changing the performance and character
of private economies throughout the world. The UN's regu-
latory efforts focus on controlling the operations of private
enterprise by pejoratively labeling every company that tries
to do business in any other country as a "multinational" cor-
poration or "transnational" enterprise.
The proposals of the various units of the UN are alien to
consumers in Western nations that thrive on private markets
and the principle of competition. Large private companies
21. International Commission for the Study of Communication
Problems, Many Voices, One World: Toward a More Just and More Efficient
World Information and Communication Order, United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris, 1980, p. 253.
22. Alex S. Jones, "UNESCO Reported to Move Away From Issue of
Licensing Reporters," The New York Times, November 6, 1984, p. 6.
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(the so-called multinational corporations) are given special at-
tention - and penalized - in the UN's proposals. Is it be-
cause they are the major alternative to direct government
control and operation of the economic development process?
More basically, business firms are singled out because they
pose a real threat to the establishment and maintenance of
concentrated economic power in government.
Regardless of the motivation of their sponsors, many of
these rules would increase costs to firms and ultimately to
consumers, and create new barriers to the flow of trade and
investment among nations. At a time when many of the de-
veloping nations are hard-pressed to earn the foreign ex-
change to service their existing debts, such regulation would
be counterproductive to their own needs. It is clear that the
rush to regulate by the UN and its agencies is misguided.
We should not be intimidated by the strong rhetoric con-
tained in the justification for these activities. The formal la-
bels applied to international regulatory efforts by the UN and
other world bodies merely cloak fundamental political con-
cerns. On the surface, the proposals deal with consumer
safety, family health, advertising, technology, and so forth. In
reality, however, these efforts are an integral part of an old-
fashioned, political power struggle. That struggle goes by a
variety of names, but its object is clear. For those concerned
with free markets and free societies, it is a dangerous delu-
sion to believe that they can remain spectators aloof from the
consequences of this new, international attack on private
enterprise.
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